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personality to the University of Illinois College of Medicine in
1956 where, despite its well-deserved high reputation, a recent
therapeutic scandal was smoldering (and occasionally bursting
into ﬂames). Its university Vice-President-Director and famous
physician-physiologist Dr. Andrew Ivy (a renowned gastrointesti-
nal physiologist who had represented the American Medical
Association at the Nurenberg Nazi Doctors Trial and subsequently
became Executive Director of the National Advisory Cancer
Council and a director of the American Cancer Society) had
recently been accused of fraudulently defending the efﬁcacy of a
quack cancer remedy, Krebiozen (which turned out to be simple
creatine) [1]. Although none of my teachers (some of whom were
involved in attempts to resolve the dispute) ever spoke of the
scandal, there was an atmosphere of skepticism toward authority
ﬁgures around the place that fostered iconoclasm.
For example, by 1959 I had become a ﬁnal-year medical student,
and I once found myself responsible for a teenager who had been
admitted to a medical ward with hepatitis (this episode is described
in detail elsewhere, both in my answer to the question: Tell us
about medical school. What happened there, and how did it shape
your later career? and in an essay I wrote for the James Lind Library
—a 1955 clinical trial report that changed my career) [2]. After a few
days of enforced total bed rest—the standard management of the
condition—his spirits and energy returned and he asked me to let
him get up and around. I felt I needed to have a look at relevant
evidence to guide my response to his request. I went to the library
and came across a remarkable report [3] for which the lead author
was Tom Chalmers. A meticulously conducted randomized trial
had made it clear that there was no good evidence to justify
patients with hepatitis to remain in bed after they feel well. Armedwith this evidence, I convinced my supervisors to let me apologize
to my patient and encourage him to be up and about as much as he
wished. His subsequent clinical course was uneventful.
Gathering momentum, during my postgraduate training in inter-
nal medicine, the better I became at diagnosing my patients’
illnesses, the more frustrated I became at my profession’s collective
ignorance about how I should treat them, or whether I should treat
them at all. I was already caring for patients at McMaster when the
practice of treating “peptic” ulcers by freezing stomachs came into
question [4], and before 1967 [5], the “experts” advised against treat-
ing symptomless diastolic blood pressures of less than 130 mm Hg.
Contemporary therapeutics was mostly based on clinical
observations of treatments applied by expert clinicians. But I
came to the conclusion that there were four things wrong about
the way they were using their clinical observations in those days
to decide whether a treatment did more good than harm; more
precisely, I was worried that these four “wrongs” destroyed our
ability to make “fair comparisons” of the effects of different
treatments. The validation of these worries both initiated and
reinforced my decision to devote most of my career to random-
ized controlled trials (RCTs).Worry 1: I Became Worried That Clinicians Might
Preferentially Give New Treatments to Patients with
Better Prognoses
One of my “rotations” as ﬁrst-year medical resident was the Admit-
ting Clinic, where I evaluated referrals from all over Illinois (who
were seeking the free care we could provide) to determine whether
they would be “good teaching cases” for the medical and surgicalociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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resident colleague taught me that they had two “general surgery”
services and that they evaluated innovative operations by perform-
ing them on the “A Service” (where he scrubbed) while continuing to
perform standard operations on the “B Service.” Although a perfect
setting for randomization, when we examined a patient and found
him or her suitable for one of their comparative studies, my surgical
colleague decided where they went. Over time, I became convinced
that he was preferentially admitting eligible surgical patients with
sounder hearts, healthier lungs, and higher hematocrit levels to
receive the new, promising operations on his A Service. Thus
sensitized, I began to pay more attention to the therapeutic recom-
mendations for new, untested treatments I received from my
medical attendings and consultants, and again concluded that,
within the same illness, it was my healthier patients whom they
considered “good candidates” for the latest, untested treatment.
It was decades later that Iain Chalmers introducedme to themost
telling conﬁrmation of this ﬁrst concern. In New York City in the
1930s, babies born into households that included members with
pulmonary tuberculosis were at a high risk of dying from the disease
before their ﬁrst birthdays. Although the Bacillus Calmette–Guérin
(BCG) vaccine was already in use and touted to protect such infants, a
New York City public health team that includedMargaret Sackett (I do
not knowwhether we are related, but I herewith claim to be her long-
lost nephew) was skeptical about these claims and therefore carried
out two BCG “trials” [6]. In the ﬁrst “trial,” public health physicians
were assigned batches of at-risk newborns and told: “vaccinate half of
them.” The results were spectacular: the risk of dying before their ﬁrst
birthday was reduced by 80% among vaccinated babies.
In the second “trial,” however, the decision about whom to
vaccinate was taken out of the physicians’ hands and was
determined by “drawing lots,” generating a fair comparison of
BCG efﬁcacy. The results were no less spectacular, but in this case
quite “negative”: the risk of dying before their ﬁrst birthday was
identical between vaccinated and nonvaccinated babies.
This presented the opportunity to determine how the physi-
cians in the ﬁrst trial (told to vaccinate half of them) made the
decision to vaccinate some babies but not others. This inquiry
revealed that they were more likely to vaccinate babies who were
headed for wealthier, less crowded households whose family
members had less severe tuberculosis. The BCG-inoculated
babies had better prognoses before they were vaccinated!
Thus, clinicians often do preferentially treat patients with better
prognoses. And, that is why our RCTs used the fair comparison
strategies of random allocation and concealment (from treating
clinicians) of the treatment that was destined to be given to the
patient they were considering enrolling onto an RCT [7].Worry 2: I Became Worried That Compliant Patients
Might Have Better Prognoses, Regardless of Their
Treatment
My ﬁrst 5 clinical years as student and postgraduate trainee gave
me the opportunity to observe and contribute to the care of a few
hundred patients, and I had kept an irregular list of their treat-
ments, clinical courses, and outcomes folded into my copy of
Harrison’s medical text. As they accumulated, two perplexing
conclusions emerged. First, I was surprised to discover that only
about half of my patients regularly reﬁlled their prescriptions and
took their medicine (it was already “common knowledge” that we
physicians were poor compliers, but we had naively thought our
patients were much better). Some of them simply disappeared, and
those who returned to the clinic continued their poor compliance
despite our exhortations and often succumbed to their illnesses.
Second, the rest of my patients who reﬁlled their prescriptions
on time and appeared compliant not only had better prognosesbut also appeared to achieve them regardless of whether my
treatments were supported by strong evidence (e.g., the early
trials in complicated severe hypertension), on the one hand, or by
little or no evidence (e.g., the contemporary treatments for
coronary heart disease), on the other. Looking more closely, I
noted that they also were less likely to be smokers, heavy
drinkers, or overweight. Finally, and harking back to my ﬁrst
“worry,” they often were the patients whom my seniors picked as
“good candidates” for new, untested treatments.
On the basis of the foregoing, I began to worry whether high
compliance might be a “marker” for rosier prognoses, regardless of
therapy. Conﬁrmation of this worry had to wait for compelling
examples of this phenomenon in analyses of placebo groups in
RCTs. For example, when the 1960s Coronary Drug Project (I had
entered patients into this trial when I was a house ofﬁcer in
Buffalo in 1966) [8] randomized myocardial infarction survivors to
placebo or one of several of that decade’s lipid-lowering agents,
they were hard-pressed to ﬁnd a drug that worked. For example,
the 5-year mortality for participants randomized to cloﬁbrate (20%)
was no better than for those randomized to placebo (21%) [9].
Their hopes rose when they noted that a third of cloﬁbrate-
assigned patients were taking less that 80% of their assigned
medicines, and they decided that a better measure of cloﬁbrate’s
efﬁcacy would be to compare the mortality of cloﬁbrate non-
compliers with that of the majority who were taking 80% or more
of their cloﬁbrate. The results were (temporarily) encouraging:
good “adherers” to cloﬁbrate had substantially lower 5-year
mortality than did poor adherers to cloﬁbrate (0.15 vs. 0.246;
Relative Risk Reduction ¼ 39%; z ¼ 3.86; P ¼ 0.00011).
However, the hero statistician of the trial, Paul Canner, carried
out a similar analysis for participants who did and did not take their
placebos and showed an even greater compliance effect on mortality
(0.151 vs. 0.282; Relative Risk Reduction ¼ 46%; z ¼ 8.12; P ¼
0.00000000000000047). The number needed to treat to save another
life by faithfully taking the placebo was 10! And, in a major
contribution to our (?non-) understanding of the “compliance effect,”
they documented that the increased risk of death among poor
placebo compliers could not be accounted for by the measures one
might insert into a “propensity score,” in this case 40 baseline
characteristics associated with 5-year mortality. After this “propen-
sity score correction,” the Relative Risk Reduction of 46% fell only to
36%, the z score from 8.12 to 5.78, and the P value from
0.00000000000000047 to a still-overwhelming 0.00000000073.
The investigators concluded: “These ﬁndings and various
other analyses of mortality in the cloﬁbrate and placebo groups
of the project show the serious difﬁculty, if not impossibility, of
evaluating treatment efﬁcacy in subgroups determined by patient
responses (e.g., adherence or cholesterol change) to the treat-
ment protocol after randomization.”
Compliant patients do have better prognoses, regardless of their
treatment (Rx) (as long as it is not inherently toxic). And that is why
our RCTs have used the fair comparison strategies of unobtrusive
compliance measures, intention-to-treat analyses, and keeping
track of everybody who enters them. (I recently toted up the losses
to follow-up among the 412,000 participants from trials in which I
was a principal investigator or co-principal investigator and they
amount to 0.4%. However, Walsh et al. [8] have documented that
more than 50% of “positive” RCTs in leading journals have losses to
follow-up that exceed the fragility of their positive result.)Worry 3: I Became Worried That Patients Who Liked
Their Rx Might Report Better Outcomes Unrelated to
the True Efﬁcacy of Their Treatments
As clinical clerks on the internal medicine service we were
encouraged to read the weekly Journal of the American Medical
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For example, in May 1959 we learned from JAMA about the ﬁrst
few successful cardiopulmonary resuscitations and how the
active ingredient in the Sabin polio vaccine rapidly spreads
throughout an institutional population, and the NEJM told us
how to select patients for “deﬁnitive” surgery for their duodenal
ulcers and how we could obtain rapid polio immunization by
injecting 10 ml of the Salk vaccine.
But the article in the NEJM that made the greatest lasting
impression on me was the report from a surgeon, Leonard Cobb,
and his colleagues [10] who had randomized and blinded a group
of patients who were so seriously limited by angina that most
were unemployed.
Randomized to what? In the decade before their RCT, thousands
of patients with angina pectoris had undergone the “miracle oper-
ation” of internal mammary artery ligation (based on the theory that
blood previously coursing down these arteries would be partially
redistributed to the coronary circulation). As reported in Readers’
Digest for July 1957 [11]: “complete or partial relief from the pain that
accompanies the major types of heart disease has been obtained in
nearly 80% of the several hundred operations performed to date.”
This simple operation (done under local anesthesia in just a few
minutes) became so popular that one wag suggested: “It is, perhaps,
surprising that between 1955 and 1960 there were still patients with
angina whose mammary arteries were not ligated.” Indeed, all the
three patients I had examined with incidental intercostal scars
claimed that their operations had improved or relieved their angina.
Thus, although Cobb’s RCT “subjects were informed of the fact that
this procedure had not been proved to be of value, … many were
aware of the enthusiastic report published in the Readers’ Digest.”
Cobb’s trial patients had their internal mammary arteries
surgically exposed (while screened from their vision). After a
ligature had been loosely placed around these arteries, the surgeon
was handed a “randomly selected envelope” that contained a card
instructing him either to tie off the arteries or to remove the loose
ligature and leave them alone. Thus, the patients had neither the
choice nor the knowledge of whether their arteries were ligated.
During their 3- to 15-month follow-up by physicians who were
blind to whether trial participants had been ligated, some
spectacular results were documented: for example, case 4, pre-
viously unable to work because of his angina, reported almost
instant relief and was able to return to work (in fact, however, his
arteries had not been ligated). However, “The average improve-
ment was 32% for the ligated patients and 43% for those whose
internal mammary arteries were not ligated.” The trialists con-
cluded: “Bilateral skin incisions in the second intercostal space
seem to be at least as effective as internal-mammary-artery
ligation in the therapy of angina pectoris.”
Although internal mammary ligation rapidly disappeared
after this and a second RCT, this “positive expectation bias” has
continued to haunt attempts to critically appraise therapeutic
fads to the present day, as we continue to debate the efﬁcacy of
“liberation therapy” for patients with multiple sclerosis.
Patients who like their Rx do report better outcomes unrelated
to the true efﬁcacy of their treatments. That is why our RCTs used
(whenever possible, and it is possible more than detractors might
think) blinding of trial patients to their treatments, “hard” out-
comes such as total mortality, and the “blind” adjudication of
softer outcomes.Worry 4: I Was Worried That Clinicians Who Liked
Their Rx Might Report Spuriously Better Outcomes
Among Patients Who Received Them
The internal mammary ligation ﬁasco also hardened my worry
that physicians writing prescriptions might be as guilty ofoverreporting their favorable effects as the patients who ﬁlled
and consumed them. Although the James Lind Library (a treasure
trove of reports and resources on the fair comparison of treat-
ments) [12] notes that the need for the blind assessment of
treatment effects was emphasized 2 years before I was born [13],
the hardest evidence that clinicians who like their Rx report
spuriously better outcomes comes from far more recent RCTs.
For example, in a promising placebo-controlled Canadian RCT
of weekly plasma exchange, prednisone, and cyclophosphamide
among patients with multiple sclerosis, two sets of neurologists
were asked to determine treatment responses at 6, 12, and 24
months [14]. Neurologists who were blind to the treatments
reported no difference in outcomes among the treatment groups
at any time. However, unblinded neurologists reported statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly improved outcomes for patients receiving triple
therapy at all three follow-up assessments.
Clinicians who like their Rx do report spuriously better out-
comes. That is why our RCTs blind outcome assessors whenever
we can, draw conclusions from hard outcomes if possible, and
blindly adjudicate softer outcomes.
Finally, some 40 delightful years later, as I witness the
emerging era of comparative effectiveness research and propen-
sity scores, I have not encountered convincing examples in which
the proponents of observational studies of efﬁcacy have devel-
oped strategies and tactics for avoiding and/or overcoming these
four worries that have forced me into hard RCT labor for the past
48 years. Indeed, I am curious as to how they will (and could) tell
whether they have avoided or solved them.
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